Economic efficiency is improved in the presence of an implemented risk management program of the insurer. Risk management requirements are imposed by regulators to reduce the insurers' insolvency risk, as well as to improve the insurance market stability. We extend the classical analysis on optimal insurance design to the case when the insurer implements regulatory requirements (Value-at-Risk). Optimal designs for both the insurer and the insured are derived explicitly. Our analysis reveals that insured are better protected in the event of greater loss irrespective of the optimal design from either the insured or the insurer perspective. Therefore the overall insurance market becomes more stable.
Introduction
This paper shows that insured are better protected in the event of a large loss irrespective of the optimal design from either the insured's or the issuer's side, when the insurer implements risk management metrics imposed by regulators. The insurance market efficiency and its stability are improved in the presence of a risk management program of the insurer. Hence, this paper offers theoretical support to adopting risk management metrics in the insurance marketplace.
Insurance regulators want to protect policyholders from the default of insurance companies and to ensure that the public has confidence in the insurance market. For this purpose, a capital reserve is often required to cover the difference between the expected loss and the "worst-case" loss over some time horizons. The worst-case loss is expected not to be exceeded with some confidence level. Due to the successful implementation of global banking regulations on capital adequacy known as Basel II, current priorities of insurance regulators are to introduce new accounting standards as well as contributing to international debate about similar rules planned for the insurance sector. For example, in Solvency II 1 , the economic capital could be calculated by an internal VaR model.
However, details of the economic impact of new regulation 2 still remain elusive.
We develop a theoretical framework to investigate the economic consequences for the insured and therefore to the insurance market in the presence of regulatory risk management requirements on insurers. The study is done under the expected utility paradigm and the risk management requirement is interpreted as a VaR constraint. The main contributions of this paper are two-fold.
First, we examine the effects on the insurance market when regulators impose a VaR constraint to the insurer. We characterize the optimal insurance contracts from the insurer's perspective to meet VaR risk management constraints. We show that the insurer's optimal insurance contract is a double-capped indemnity (Proposition 4.1). We also derive the optimal insurance contract from the insured 's perspective in the presence of risk management constraints imposed on the insurer. Given the VaR constraint, the optimal contract for insured is a capped deductible plus a deductible (Proposition 5.1). To an-1 Solvency II is a new regulatory capital framework for insurance companies initiated by the European Union and starting to be developed in Northern America. We refer to EFMA's report (2006) for its current stage.
2 Our regulatory risk management is different from the regulatory constraints considered in Raviv (1979) . Raviv's description of the regulatory constraint is based on Joskow (1973) and Peltzman (1976) . In those previous literature, regulation is endogenous while current regulation becomes compulsory.
alyze the market effects of the presence of the VaR constraint, we compare the optimal insurance contract in the presence of regulation constraints with the standard results of Arrow (1971) and Raviv (1979) . We show that insured obtain better protection in the event of higher loss and that this higher protection for large loss is compensated by a relatively lower protection against medium loss. That clearly makes risk-averse insured better off since they are more concerned with large loss amount. Our paper provides some theoretical support of VaR risk management metrics in the insurance market.
Second, this paper contributes to the optimal insurance design literature by adding a regulatory risk management constraint. Previous results in Arrow (1971) , Raviv (1979) , Cummins and Mahul (2004) and Golubin (2006) can be viewed as special cases of our results in this paper. Moreover, because of the non-convexity feature of the VaR constraint, we make use of the theory of "non-decreasing rearrangement" which was introduced in the insurance literature by Carlier and Dana (2003, 2005) . The theory of "non-decreasing rearrangements" enables us to verify one revelation principle in our context: we show it suffices to consider non-decreasing indemnities.
The optimal insurance contracts from both insurer and insured's perspective share a common feature: insured always obtain better protection in the event of a large loss. This result is meaningful since risk management requirements are intended to protect insured, in particular from large loss amounts. However, whether the VaR risk management requirement really enhances the efficiency and stability of the market still stimulates lots of controversial arguments. For instance, in the context of financial market, Basak and Shapiro (2001) derives that the presence of VaR risk managers amplifies the stock-market volatility in a downward market and attenuates the volatility in an upward market. Our paper reveals some positive aspects of the regulatory risk management requirement in the insurance market.
The approach of this paper is rather theoretical. An alternative is the empirical study by Cummins, Dionne, Gagné and Nouira (2007) which indicates that risk management contributes significantly to enhancing efficiency. Another related strand of literature emphasizes the risk management activities of insurer, viewed as financial intermediation (e.g. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) ). One objective of our paper is to compare the optimal insurance contracts Ex Ante and Ex Post the VaR risk management implementation. We don't address the issue how insurers implement the VaR risk management system. But when they appropriately implement the VaR model, the effects to insured's final wealth as well as the market efficiency are examined, in particular from the insured's perspective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2: the optimal indemnity design problems are presented for both insurer and insured.
Feasibility of the constraints involved in these two problems are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to deriving the optimal insurance contract for the insurer and Section 5 the optimal insurance contract for the insured. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are presented in Appendices.
The Model
We consider a group of risk-averse individuals (insurance buyers). Each of them is endowed with non-random initial wealth and is exposed to a random, but insurable, loss x i . There is a risk-averse insurer (insurance seller) who writes an insurance contract to the group of insured for the aggregate loss x = x i . N is the largest possible loss amount of x. The randomness of the market is represented by a probability space (Ω, Pr{}). Each realized loss x i is the product of the total aggregate loss x by the share a i of that individual in the aggregate loss x i = a i x. An insurance policy, {I(x), P }, provides the reimbursement I(x) when the loss x occurs and P is the premium paid initially to the insurer. It is assumed that the premium P is a function of the actuarial value (as in Raviv (1979) ). Say
where φ(x) is a general strictly increasing function and φ(x) x. To investigate the risksharing of the aggregate loss x, we consider a representative insured with initial wealth w 0 who buys insurance on the aggregate loss.
The insurer is endowed with non-random initial wealth w and c(.) is the cost faced by the insurer in addition to paying the reimbursement. For the ease of exposition, c(I) = ηI, η > 0 3 . The risk preference of the insurer is represented by a concave utility function V (x) defined over (0, +∞) and satisfying Inada's conditions, that is
The utility function of the representative insured is denoted by U (x), which is strictly concave and also satis-3 The method could easily be applied to more general function forms of the cost function where the function C defined by C(I) = I + c(I) is non-decreasing, differentiable over ]0, N [, and C is invertible. fies Inada's conditions. The insurer's final wealth is given by
Assume that w − v is the insolvent trigger level such that whenever W < w − v the insurer is insolvent. Since W < w − v is equivalent to I(x) > v+P 1+η
, then to avoid the insolvency risk of the insurer, the indemnity I(x) must satisfy I(x) v+P 1+η
, which means W w − v. If the insurer aims to maximize the expected utility V (W ) subject to the
, the problem is equivalent to imposing an upper limit on coverage. This optimal insurance design problem from insured's perspective is solved by Cummins and Mahul (2004) . Later in this paper (Section 5) we extend the upper limit constraint to the case when it is satisfied with a confidence level. This amounts to set a value-at-risk (VaR) limit on the insurer's risk management metric imposed by a regulator to deal with systematic risk.
Precisely, assume v is the VaR limit of the loss of time horizon T with confidence level α. Then, the final wealth of the insurer satisfies:
where v and α are both introduced by regulators. We now present the optimal insurance design problems for both insurer and insured in the presence of the VaR constraint (3).
From the insurer's perspective
The optimal design problem for the insurer in the above framework is as follows:
Problem 2.1. Find an indemnity I(x) such that
The first constraint is standard (see Arrow (1971) , Raviv (1979) ). Given a premium principle P = φ(E[I(x)]), the second constraint can be interpreted as a "premium con-straint", it means that the premium is equal to φ(∆). It is worth to point out that our paper focuses on the optimal design and has nothing to do with the optimal premium (level). The determination of the optimal premium is often solved, by fixing a premium first and next by finding an optimal premium to solve a standard maximum problem in calculus (Raviv (1979); Schlesinger (1981) ; Meyer and Ormiston (1999) ). The third constraint is the VaR constraint (3).
The last constraint has to be satisfied to prevent downward misrepresentation of the damage by the insured. This constraint is first imposed by Huberman, Mayers and Smith (1983) , and it is used to resolve the ex post moral hazard issue. Similarly to Huberman et al. (1983) , the non-decreasing assumption is imposed rather than derived from moral hazard implications or the presence of audit costs (e.g. Picard (2000) ). In fact, this constraint is closely related to the revelation principle (Harris and Townsend (1981) , Myerson (1979) ): the search for an optimal indemnity schedule can be confined to the schedules under which the insured has no incentive to misrepresent the damage, that are non-decreasing indemnities only. This revelation principle in our framework is justified by the theory of "non-decreasing rearrangements", which has been successfully used by Carlier and Dana (2003, 2005) to deal with nonconvex problems in other contexts. Therefore, even without the last constraint on the indemnity I(x), our solution of Problem 2.1 still holds for the optimal non-decreasing indemnity. However, this "non-decreasing assumption" is a key element in dealing with the VaR constraint (3).
From the insured's perspective
To understand the effects on the insurance market of regulators, we also consider the optimal contract design from the insured's perspective. The insurance contract is written on the aggregate loss x and we investigate the perspective of the representative insured.
From the perspective of the buyer's side, the VaR constraint on the seller can be violated when a pool of losses happen simultaneously. Under the VaR risk management constraint (3), the optimal contract design for the representative insured is the following:
Both Problem 2.1 and 2.2 are subject to the same constraints on I(x). Similar to Problem 2.1, the theory of "non-decreasing rearrangement" is used to justify one revelation principle that confine to those indemnity under which the insured have no incentive to misrepresent the damage, thus the last constraint "I(x) is non-decreasing". Therefore, our solution of the optimal indemnity of Problem 2.2 without the last constraint is the same as the solution of Problem 2.2. By imposing this "non-decreasing assumption" precisely, however, the VaR constraint (3) can be tackled directly.
Previous Literature In a recent paper, Huang (2006) considers the following problem:
where W i = w 0 −P −x+I(x) is the wealth of the insured. There are several significant differences between Huang (2006)'s problem and Problem 2.2. First, Huang (2006) imposes a probability constraint on the insured's final wealth W i rather than on the insurer. Second, this probability constraint is not a standard value-at-risk constraint (as we did in (3)). Indeed, Huang (2006) 's probability constraint is expressed as P r{W
. Therefore, this constraint controls the variability of the retention of the loss x − I rather than the total loss amount. It turns out that the premium P is not involved in this probability constraint, so the optimal contract, when it exists, is independent of the premium. Moreover, there are some technical issues in Huang (2006) 's derivations. For instance, the probability constraint is not necessarily binding as shown in Section 4.1 below.
Benchmark Contracts
When α = 1, that is in the absence of the VaR constraint (3), standard results in previous literature solve Problems 2.1 and 2.2. These standard results are summarized in the following proposition 2.1 and will be used in our subsequent analysis.
Recall that a capped indemnity is a full insurance up to a capped level, written as
and a deductible indemnity is a full insurance above a deductible, with indemnification function
For ease of exposition 4 , we suppose N , the largest possible loss amount of x satisfies:
which implies that the insurer's wealth and the insured's wealth are both non-negative.
Proposition 2.1. Let A be a measurable subset of Ω with positive measure Pr{A}, and
1 There exists a positive number c > 0 such that the capped indemnity I c (x)1 A solves:
where the cap c is determined by
(almost surely) optimal indemnity solving (5).
2 There exists a positive number d > 0 such that the deductible I d (x)1 A solves:
where the deductible d is determined by
A is the unique (almost surely) optimal indemnity solving (6).
In the case of Pr{A} = 1, the first part is proved by Raviv (1979) and the second part is Arrow (1971)'s deductible optimal contract. The first part is the optimal design for the insurer, the second constraint in (5) means that the premium is greater than a fixed amount. This makes economic sense because the insurer requires a minimum premium to cover costs. On the other hand, the insured has a maximum upfront payment he is willing to pay (see the second constraint in (6)). In our subsequent applications the constraint
This proposition also follows from results by Golubin (2006) for Pr{A} = 1. When 0 < Pr{A} < 1, the proof is similar by restricting the space probability to the states of nature in the set A.
3 Feasible Constraints in Problem 2.1 and 2.2
Before solving Problem 2.1 and 2.2, we need to discuss the feasibility of the constraints.
For instance, when the actuarial value ∆ is too small, there might not exist indemnity
I(x) such that the VaR constraint (3) holds. Or equivalently, when the confidence level
α is large in constraint (3), the actuarial value E[I(x)] should not be too small. The actuarial value ∆ of the indemnity I(x), and the VaR parameters {v, α} must satisfy some conditions which make the constraints in Problems 2.1 and 2.2 feasible. The purpose of this section is to clarify the set of feasible constraints.
From now on, we denote by a = P+v 1+η
. The first auxiliary problem solves for the possible range of the VaR parameters {v, α} when the actuarial value is given.
Problem 3.1. Solve the optimal indemnity I(x) such that
Problem 3.1 can be interpreted as the maximum probability of the event that the indemnity I(x) is less than a if a minimal actuarial value ∆ is guaranteed. This formulation doesn't depend on the premium principle, but if the premium principle is used, it turns out that Problem 3.1 determines the maximum survival probability 5 when a minimum premium is charged up front. The solution of Problem 3.1 is presented in the next proposition.
5 Recall that I(x) > a is equivalent to W < w − v.
Proposition 3.1. Define
1. If ∆ < ∆ min (a), the maximum survival probability in Problem 3.1 is one, and any indemnity I c (x) with c a and E[I c (x)] ∆ is optimal for Problem 3.1.
, then there exists a positive λ a such that the coverage:
is optimal, where λ is determined by solving the E[J a,λ (x)] = ∆. Moreover, among the non-decreasing optimal indemnities, J a,λ (x) is unique almost surely.
Proof. See Appendix A. This graph displays the optimal insurance contract of maximizing survival probability with a = 3 and λ = 5. There is a discontinuity when x = λ.
The second auxiliary problem is the dual to Problem 3.1. It solves for the range of the actuarial value ∆ when the VaR constraint (3) is imposed.
Problem 3.2. Solve for the indemnity I(x)
Since the premium is based on the actuarial value, Problem 3.2 is a maximum premium strategy under the VaR constraint (3). For a risk-neutral insurer, the maximum premium strategy is the same as maximizing the expected utility under VaR requirements.
Proposition 3.2. Let q be the (1 − α) quantile of x, that is Pr{x q} = 1 − α.
1. If Pr{x > a} < α, or equivalently, q a, then Pr{I(x) > a} < α since I(x) x.
Therefore the full insurance I(x) = x solves Problem 3.2.
2. If 0 < α Pr{x > a}, or equivalently a < q, then the coverage J a,q (X) solves Problem 3.2. Moreover, any non-decreasing optimal indemnity of Problem 3.2 is
Proof. See Appendix A.
. According to Prop 3.2, ∆ max is the maximum possible actuarial value of the indemnity ; thus φ(∆ max ) is the maximum possible premium while the VaR constraint (3) is imposed. Hence, to make both Problem 2.1 and Problem 2.2 feasible, we assume:
Optimal Design for the Insurer
This section presents the optimal design for the risk-averse insurer subject to VaR regulation rules and compares with Raviv's (1979) classical capped indemnity in the absence of the VaR constraint.
For the ease of exposition of the optimal design of the insurer and insured (in the next section), we term a double-capped indemnity as I c 1 (x)1 x q + I c 2 (x)1 x>q , where To solve Problem 2.1, we first consider the following problem.
Problem 4.1.
Then, Problem 2.1 is easily solved after characterizing the optimal indemnity of Problem 4.1 for a general probability parameter α. Later (see Section 4.1 below), we will rationalize this approach because the VaR constraint (3) is not necessarily binding in Problem 2.1.
Proposition 4.1. For any 0 < ∆ ∆ max , a < q, where q is the (1 − α) quantile of x, 1. If ∆ ∆ min , then there exists a positive c a such that the capped indemnity
is the optimal indemnity of Problem 2.1.
2. If ∆ min < ∆ ∆ max , then there exists a positive c > a such that the doublecapped indemnity I a (x)1 x q + I c (x)1 x>q is the optimal indemnity of Problem 4.1.
Moreover, the non-decreasing optimal indemnity of Problem 4.1 is unique almost
Proof. See Appendix B for the second part.
The first part of this proposition follows from Proposition 2.1 easily. If ∆ ∆ min , then there exists a positive c a such that ∆ = ∆ min (c). Hence by Proposition 2.1, the capped indemnity I c (x) is the optimal indemnity subject to the premium constraint that
is also optimal to Problem 2.1 since Pr{W < w − v} = 0 and the VaR constraint is redundant.
Our contribution is the second part of Proposition 4.1. Its proof is quite complicated.
We explain briefly the main ideas. The proof is divided into three steps. The first step verifies the revelation principle: it suffices to consider non-decreasing indemnities I(x) only. This step makes use of "non-decreasing rearrangement". In the second step, by considering non-decreasing indemnity only, the optimal indemnity of Problem 4.1 is characterized as a double-capped indemnity as I(x) = I c 1 (x)1 x q + I c 2 (x)1 x>q . The last step is the most technical. We show that, the first cap level c 1 in the optimal indemnity is equal to a. Thus, there is only one unknown parameter, the second cap level c, which is determined by the actuarial value E[I(x)] = ∆. When ∆ = ∆ max , the result is consistent with the Proposition 3.2.
The optimal indemnity of Problem 4.1 can be written as a combination of some simple indemnities. If the second cap c q, the optimal indemnity can be written as I a (x) + (c − a)1 x>q , a capped indemnity plus an indemnity which pays a constant amount c − a only when the loss amount x is (strictly) greater than a 6 . This indemnity is called a "digital indemnity" since it corresponds to a digital option contract in the financial market. If c > q, there are three components in the optimal contract. The first one is the capped indemnity I a (x), the second one is a digital indemnity (q − a)1 x>q , while the last one is a capped deductible indemnity with deductible q and cap level c − q. In the presence of the digital indemnity, both insurer and insured are willing and able to shift the reimbursements from medium to the large level of loss. If this kind of digital indemnity is absent, there are not enough (Arrow-Debreu) securities to build the optimal policy. In the next section, we derive the same results from the insured's perspective as well.
A remarkable feature in the optimal design is its discontinuous-indemnity ingredient in the event {x > q}. This discontinuous ingredient is pervasive in the optimal design when a probability constraint is involved, and it appeared also in Gollier (1987) , Gajek and Zagrodny (2004) and in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 of the last section. We argue that the presence of discontinuous indemnities, however, improves the market efficiency.
According to Prop 4.1, the non-decreasing optimal indemnity of Problem 4.1 is unique.
This uniqueness result is somewhat surprising. The subtle issue is the non-convex style constraint Pr{W < w − v} = α. Hence, there are no available standard results about the existence and the uniqueness when the constraint is non-convex (see Luenberger (1971) ).
We are now able to solve the Problem 2.1. Because of the uniqueness result in Proposition 4.1, we use I α to denote the unique (almost surely) non-decreasing indemnity in Proposition 4.1 for a corresponding parameter α. The next proposition presents the optimal indemnity of Problem 2.1. To highlight the dependence on the probability level α,
where q α is the (1 − α) quantile of x. As a function of the argument α, ∆ max (α) is non-decreasing.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that ∆ min < ∆ < ∆ max (α) and a < q where q is the (1 − α)-
, there exists a non-decreasing indemnity I α 1 (x) solving Problem 4.1 where α is replaced by α 1 . Let
Then Iα is an optimal solution of Problem 2.1. Moreover, any non-decreasing optimal solution of Problem 2.1 must be a double-capped indemnity.
This proposition follows from Prop 4.1 easily. By continuity arguments and monotonicity of ∆ max (α) with respect to the argument α, there exists α min ∈ [0, α], such that ∆ max (α min ) = ∆. The existence ofα is also evident using a continuity argument.
The VaR constraint is not binding
As will be numerically shown in this section, T (α 1 ) := E V w + P − (1 + η) I α 1 (x) is not necessarily monotonic. Consequently, the VaR constraint Pr{W < w − v} α is not always binding for the optimal solution in Problem 2.1. This point is remarkable since we have to reduce Problem 2.1 to solving a sequence of Problem 4.1 as outlined above. This point, however, is overlooked in Huang (2006) . 
Analysis
The explicit optimal design derived in the previous section enables us to compare with Raviv's (1979) optimal design without VaR constraint. To illustrate this comparison we consider two identical insurance companies while one implements the VaR policy that Pr{W < w − v} α and another doesn't. We consider the impact to the insurer and the insured separately. For this purpose we assume the same premium P is paid and the insurance contracts are issued based on the optimal design by Proposition 4.1 and From Figure 3 , both companies provide full insurance for insured when the loss x a.
If the median loss of x occurs, say a x q, Raviv's optimal contract provides higher protection for the insured. In the event of a high loss of x > q, the insurance company which follows the risk management policy actually provides better protection to insured.
Higher protection for extreme loss looks more attractive for risk-averse insurance buyers.
On the other hand, from the insurer's perspective, Raviv's optimal insurance is not acceptable because it would violate regulatory requirements. To meet the VaR requirement, the insurer is willing to provide relatively higher indemnity protection when an extreme loss occurs, and consequently, to provide less protection if the loss x occurs in a median level a x q. The digital indemnity improves the risk-sharing mechanism, 7 The density is given by and it enables to shift the indemnity from a medium level of loss to the coverage of large losses. 
Loss x r=2 a=1
Insurer's optimum Raviv's optimum
Optimal Design for Insured
The previous section presents the optimal insurance design for the insurer. In this section, we discuss the optimal insurance design for insured in the presence of insurer's risk management policies. In the presence of a risk management constraint, Arrow's (1971) deductible policy might not be available because it doesn't meet the VaR requirement for the insurer. Therefore, the risk management constraint for insurer indirectly influences the optimal design for insured.
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Similar to Section 4, we reduce Problem 2.2 to the following problem 5.1 where α is a generic probability parameter.
Problem 5.1. Find the indemnity I such that:
The next proposition explicitly characterizes the optimal non-decreasing indemnity for the insured in Problem 5.1, and consequently, solve Problem 2.2.
Proposition 5.1. For any 0 ∆ ∆ max (α), a < q, where q is the (1 − α) quantile of 2. If ∆ min (α) < ∆ ∆ max (α), then the unique non-decreasing optimal indemnity I * of Problem 5.1 is written as: 
The second part of Proposition 5.1 presents the optimal insurance design for the insured under insurer's risk management constraint when the premium P ∈ (φ( ∆ min ), φ(∆ max )).
A complete proof is fairly lengthy and technical (See Appendix C for details). Thus it is helpful to explain intuitions of the proof. Similar to the proof of Prop 4.1, there are three steps. In the first step, we verify the revelation principle so we confine ourselves to non-decreasing indemnities. The second step is to characterize the optimal design as min{a, I d 1 (x)}1 x q + I d 2 (x)1 x>q . The last step is to prove that one particular indemnity is optimal. Namely, d 1 = d 2 in the optimal indemnity contract. When ∆ = ∆ max , the result is consistent with Proposition 3.2.
In a special case α = 0, then q α = ∞, and the probability constraint Pr{W < w −v} = α is reduced to I(x) a, a.s. Then, the optimal indemnity is min{a, I d * (x)} which has been proved by Cummins and Mahul (2004) . In the next subsection, we compare the optimal indemnity in Prop 5.1 with Arrow's deductible contract with the same actuarial value. 
Analysis

Conclusions
We present a theoretical framework to examine the effects of risk management constraints imposed by regulators on insurers, on the optimal form of insurance contracting and the market efficiency. When the insurer follows the VaR metric, the optimal insurance designs from both insurer and insured's perspective are derived explicitly. In the optimal insurance designs, the insured is always better protected in the event of a higher loss. This suggests that the risk management constraint enhances the final wealth of risk-averse insured in the event of a higher loss. Therefore, our analysis rationalizes current VaR practice and offers theoretical support of regulatory's effort to impose risk management constraints in the industry marketplace.
A limitation of this model is that some audit costs are not included to address moral hazard issues corresponding to some discontinuous indemnity components (digital indemnity). Indeed, when the audit cost is not significant comparing with the premium, insured are still better protected in the large level of aggregate loss. Moreover, In the absence of digital indemnity, as we have shown in this paper, the optimal risk-sharing between insured and the insurer cannot be realized. Hence, the risk management constraint not only reduces the insolvency risk of insurer but also increases risk-sharing opportunities in the insurance market. This paper draws important economic implications of regulatory authorities' requirements on the risk-sharing issue in the insurance market. We only provide a detailed proof of the second part which requires the following two lemmas.
Lemma A.1. If Y * satisfies the three following properties:
is a solution of the following optimization problem:
* solves the optimization problem 3.1.
Proof. Given a coverage I which satisfies the constraints of the optimization problem 3.1. Therefore, using (iii), we have,
Thus, 1 Y * a − 1 I a λ (I − Y * ). After taking the expectation, and using condition (ii) one obtains, Proof. The property (i) is obviously satisfied. To check the property (iii), we first note that when x a, the objective function is 1 + λy for 0 y x. Hence x is the maximum point in this subregion {x a}. When x > a, consider two regions of y separately. In the region y ∈ [0, a], the maximum value of the function 1 y a + λy is 1 + λa at local maximum point a. On the other hand, in the region y ∈ (a, x], the maximum value of the objective function 1 y a + λy becomes λx at the local maximum point x. Thus, if λx > 1 + λa, or equivalently, x > a + 1 λ , x is the global maximum point; otherwise, a is the global maximum point. Lemma A.2 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
According to lemmas A.1 and A.2, it suffices to prove the existence of λ * > 0 such that J a,a+ 1 λ * satisfies the condition (ii) of lemma A.1. We compute expectation of J a,a+
. We have:
The existence of a solution λ * > 0 such that E λ = ∆ comes from the assumption on the continuous distribution of x and thus the continuity of function E λ of the variable λ.
We now prove that the optimal solution is unique almost surely among the nondecreasing functions of the loss amount x. Let I(x) be another optimal non-decreasing indemnity of problem 3.1 and I * = J a,a+ 1 λ *
. We prove that I(x) = I * (x) almost surely. In fact, by construction,
Since I(.) and I * (.) are both non-decreasing, there exist two positive numbers A and A * such that {I(x) a} = {x A} and {I * (x) a} = {x A * }. Because I and I * are both optimal, Pr{I(x) a} = Pr{I * (x) a}. Then Pr{x A} = Pr{x A * }. As X has a continuous distribution function, one obtains A = A * . Thus, 1 I(x) a = 1 I * (x) a a.s. Consequently, using (A1) and λ * > 0,
Since E[I * − I] = 0 and I * − I 0 a.s., one obtains I = I * a.s. Prop 3.1 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Its proof is similar to the proof of proposition 3.1. It is straightforward to see that the indemnity J a,a+λ (x(ω)) solves the static optimization problem below, for each λ > 0 and for all ω,
By using the binding VaR constraint, the optimal λ * satisfies a + λ * = q. Then J a,q (x) is thus the optimal design. The uniqueness of the optimal design is also similar.
B Proof of Prop 4.1: Optimal design for insurer
We first recall the definition of the "non-decreasing rearrangement" and its key properties (more detail can be found in Carlier and Dana (2003, 2005) ). f is called the non-decreasing rearrangement of f . There are two important properties. First one has the equi-measurability of f and f , that is for all measurable function g,
Second, a variant of Hardy Littlewood inequality holds. More precisely, if
Next lemma justifies the revelation principle in the current VaR framework. Moreover, it shows us that the optimal non-decreasing indemnity is a double-capped indemnity.
Lemma B.1. If there exists an optimal solution I * to Problem 4.1, then there exists a nondecreasing optimal indemnity I * to Problem 4.1. Moreover, any optimal non-decreasing solution of Problem 4.1 is a double-capped indemnity as follows:
where c 1 0 and c 2 0. Furthermore, c 1 a < c 2 .
Proof. Given an optimal indemnity I * , denote by I * the non-decreasing rearrangement of I * . Clearly, I * is also an optimal solution of Problem 4.1. Indeed it satisfies every constraint of Problem 4.1:
Moreover, because of the equi-measurability of I * (x) and its non-decreasing rearrangement I * (x), we have
Thus I * (x) is also optimal. The first part of this lemma has been proved. We then prove that any non-decreasing optimal solution of Problem 4.1 is a doublecapped indemnity. Assume I * is a non-decreasing optimal solution of Problem 4.1, then there exist Ω 1 and Ω 2 such that:
• Ω 1 = I * a and Ω 2 = I * > a ,
• Pr{Ω 1 } = 1 − α and Pr{Ω 2 } = α.
Since I * is non-decreasing with respect to x, there exists a constant A such that: Ω 1 = {x A} and Ω 2 = {x > A}. Recall that q is the (1 − α) quantile of the distribution of x. Because x is continuously distributed, Pr{Ω 2 } = α implies then q = A. Thus: Ω 1 = {x q} and Ω 2 = {x > q} .
Define I * 1 and I * 2 by:
and ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 such that
where J i , i = 1, 2 respectively, solves the following optimization problem:
By Proposition 2.1, there exist c 1 , c 2 0 such that
where c 1 and c 2 satisfy
Claim: c 1 a < c 2 .
Proof of the claim: In fact, E[ I * (x)1 x q ] = ∆ 1 . Since {x q} = { I * (x) a}, we have the indemnity I * 1 (x) stays in the range [0, min (x, a)] over the region {x q}, then ∆ 1 E [I a (x)1 x q ]. On the other hand, the function c → E [I c (x)1 x q ] is non-decreasing, and ∆ 1 = E[I c 1 1 x q ], then c 1 a. We now prove that c 2 > a. Actually, over Ω 2 = {x > q}, the indemnity I * is strictly greater than a.
We continue the proof of the lemma B.1. Since c 1 a, then Pr{J *
Because of the optimality of J 1 , and the fact that the solution is unique (a.s.) over Ω 1 (by Prop 2.1),
The proof is similar when i = 2. Lemma B.1 is proved.
The next lemma precisely characterizes the optimal indemnity among the set of doublecapped indemnities.
Then by combining the last two formulae we obtain a first important inequality:
We now consider the region {c 1 x q}. Over this region {c 1 x q}, we have
By concavity of V (.), for each ω ∈ Ω such that x(ω) ∈ [c 1 , q], we have
Moreover, the last inequality holds for ω such that x(ω) c 1 as well, because Y 1 (ω) = Y ′ 1 (ω) over {x c 1 }. Therefore, (B5) holds for all ω such that x(ω) q. Taking expectation over the region {x q}, we obtain a second important inequality:
Therefore, combining the two inequalities in our previous discussion, we obtain:
Equivalently,
Thus Lemma B.2 is proved.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.1. Assume ∆ min < ∆ < ∆ max .
Existence of the Optimal Indemnity:
If there exists a non-decreasing solution to Problem 4.1, lemma B.1 implies that the non-decreasing optimal solution must be a double-capped indemnity. Therefore, it suffices to prove that one double-capped indemnity is an optimal solution. Define a function g(c), for c a by
g (c) is the actuarial value of the double-capped indemnity with the first cap level a, and the second layer cap is c. The function g(c) is increasing and continuous with respect to the argument c. Clearly g (a) = ∆ min , g(N ) = ∆ max and define ∆ med = g(q). Then for any ∆ ∈ (∆ min , ∆ max ), there exists unique c > a such that g(c) = ∆. Moreover, c q if and only if ∆ ∆ med . We prove that the double-capped indemnity
is an optimal indemnity of Problem 4.1. For this purpose, let I = I(x) be another indemnity that is non-decreasing and subject to the constraints that E[I(x)] = ∆, 0 I(x) x and Pr{I(x) > a} = α. It suffices to prove that:
Since I is assumed to be non-decreasing and Pr{I > a} = α, then {I(x) > a} = {x > q} .
Let I 1 = I1 x q and I 2 = I1 x>q , and define by ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 by
Choose c 1 and c 2 such that
By using Proposition 2.1, one has:
Therefore,
where
Over {x q}, I(x) a. Then by the same proof of the Claim in the proof of lemma B.1, we have c 1 a. On the other hand, since
, and c 1 a, then c c 2 . Moreover, c 1 < a implies c 2 < c, and c 1 = a implies that c 2 = c. By lemma B.2, and note that c 1 a c 2 c, we obtain
Due to (B7) and (B8), we have proved the existence part.
Uniqueness of the non-decreasing Optimal Indemnity: Assume there exists another non-decreasing optimal indemnity for Problem 4.1, then by lemma B.1, it must be a double-capped indemnity with first layer cap c 1 a and the second layer cap c 2 > a. By lemma B.2, since this indemnity is optimal, c 1 = a. Therefore, the uniqueness follows from the strictly increasing property of the function g(c). Proposition 4.1 is proved.
C Proof of Prop 5.1: Optimal design for insured
We start with an extension of Prop 2.1 [2] with further constraints on the indemnity I(x).
Lemma C.1. Let A be a measurable subset of Ω with positive measure Pr{A}, and fixed positive numbers P, a and ∆. Assume that ∆ < E[x1 A ].
A solves the optimal solution of the following problem:
A is the unique optimal indemnity subject to the corresponding constraints (a.s.).
If
solves the optimal solution of the following problem:
Proof. When A = Ω, a similar result has been presented in Cummins and Mahul (2004) for an upper limit on coverage under an actuarial value constraint E[I(x)] = ∆. It can also be proved similarly as Proposition 2.1. Hereafter, we provide the proof when Pr{A} = 1. In the general case the proof is the same by adding 1 A throughout the discussion. The proof of the second part is similar and omitted. Given λ > 0, consider the following optimization problem:
for a parameter λ U −1 (w 0 − P ). It is easy to verify that min{(
solves the optimal insurance design problem. The proof is done when Pr{A} = 1.
Before proving Proposition 5.1, we present two lemmas which characterize the optimal indemnity among a group of non-decreasing indemnities with the form min{a,
Lemma C.2. Given α > 0, q the (1 − α) quantile ( which greater than a by assumption),
. Denote by I d 1 ,d 2 as the following indemnity:
and using the continuity of the distribution of the loss x and thus of the mapping d
, the existence and the uniqueness of d * are proved.
To prove the second part, it is worth to explain the idea first. We first interpret d 2 as a function of the variable
One easily obtains:
Denote by g the density of the loss x and differentiate this equation with respect to d 1 . Then
which is obviously negative. Hence
It is straightforward to obtain
Therefore the function κ(.) has a unique maximum when
as the following indemnity:
Proof. The proof of this lemma builds on the same ideas as the proof of lemma C.2. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: We first assume d 1 is fixed. Then we define (implicitly) d 2 as a function of the floor f by using the equation: E [F d 1 ,d 2 ,f ] = ∆. Write d 2 = ψ(f ). Differentiating the equality E F d 1 ,ψ(f ),f = ∆ with respect to f , we obtain:
which proves in particular that d 2 (f ) is an increasing function of the floor f . By abuse of notations, define κ again:
κ(f ) := E U w 0 − P − x + F d 1 ,ψ(f ),f (x) .
After some computations, we have
Over the range x ∈ (q, f + ψ(f )), −ψ(f ) < f − x, thus k ′ (f ) < 0. It means that for each f > a, there exists f 1 ∈ (a, f ) such that κ(f 1 ) > κ(f ). Therefore, there exists no maximum κ(f ) among f > a, and by Lebesgue dominance theorem, for some d 2 , Step 2: In this step we consider the indemnity of the form
with the actuarial value ∆. We prove that the expected utility of the indemnity of the form min{I d 1 , a}1 x q + max{I d 2 , a}1 x>q is dominated by the expected utility of the indemnity with d 2 = q − a. Similar to the proof of lemma C.2, we now express d 1 as a function of d 2 , say χ(d 2 ). Write: E I χ(d 2 ),d 2 = ∆. Then
Define (by abuse of notation one more time) κ(d 2 ) = E U w 0 − P − x + I χ(d 2 ),d 2 , by straightforward computation we have
Since d 1 = χ(d 2 ) d 2 , then κ ′ (d 2 ) < 0. Therefore κ(d 2 ) κ(q − a) for all d 2 > q − a. Then the lemma follows from lemma C.2 easily.
Proof of Proposition 5.1: Assume ∆ min (α) < ∆ < ∆ max .
Step 1. If there exists an optimal solution I * to Problem 5.1, then there exists a nondecreasing optimal indemnity I * to Problem 5.1. Indeed, if I is an optimal solution then its non-decreasing rearrangement is also an optimal solution. Constraints are satisfied by I because of the properties of the non-decreasing rearrangement. Moreover, by Hardy Littlewood inequality (B2), one has: E [U (w 0 − P − x + I(x))] E U w 0 − P − x + I(x) because x → U ′ (w 0 − P − x + t) is increasing.
Step 2. Assume that I * is one non-decreasing optimal indemnity of the Problem 5.1. Because I * is non-decreasing, and Pr{I * > a} = α, then we have {I * (x) > a} = {x > q} , {I * (x) a} = {x q}.
Let I * 1 (x) = I * (x)1 x q , I * 2 (x) = I * (x)1 x>q , and ∆ i = E[I * i (x)] for i = 1, 2. We first deal with I subject to constraints 0 J(x)1 x q x1 x q , J(x)1 x q a and E[J(x)1 x q ] = ∆ 1 . Then by lemma C.1, there exists d 1 0 such that I * 1 (x) = I * (x)1 x q = min {a, I d 1 (x)} 1 x q . (C8)
Step 3. We characterize I * 2 1 x>q in this step. Define
A n := I * a + 1 n .
Then A n ⊆ A n+1 and ∪ n A n = {I(x) > a} = {x > q}. For n >> 0 (which means that there exists p 0 such that for all n p), by lemma C.1, there exists d n 0 such that
We consider the two cases separately. , and has another line in the middle a + 1 n , which is impossible for a floored deductible indemnity (because of (C10) and of A n ⊂ A n+1 ). Therefore, I n+1 = max a + 1 n , (x − d n )
+ . Continuing this procedure we have
Hence we see that, there exists n such that:
By combining
Step 2 and
Step 3 together, we have either I * = min {a, (x − d 1 ) + } 1 x q + max {f, (x − d 2 ) + } 1 x>q , f > a or I * = min {a, (x − d 1 ) + } 1 x q + (x − d 2 ) + 1 x>q . Then by using lemmas C.2 and C.3, the optimal indemnity is given by
where d * is defined in lemma C.2. Then we find out one non-decreasing optimal indemnity based on this characterization. The uniqueness follows from the proof procedure.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is then completed.
